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1 Introduction
The development of distributor brands over the past decade has raised several issues con-
cerning the notion of brand ownership. Several factors may contribute to explain why large
distributors have decided to develop their own brands (see the survey of Berges-Sennou,
Bontems and Réquillart, 2004). For instance, well established distributors with large distrib-
ution networks may leverage their position by developing reputation e¤ects over a large range
of products. This incentive to intervene as a producer may be reinforced in contexts where
concentration is high at the upstream level, because the distributor controlling its own brand
increases its bargaining position in a negotiation with dominant producers.1 Actually, Scott
Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) show evidence of the positive correlation between private
label introduction and the market share of leading national brands.2 Notice however that
while distributors have developed brands under their name for mass consumption goods, or
standardized products, they also have opted for the creation of new brands with an initially
unknown name. This is particularly true for high quality brands. Clearly while the distribu-
tors position matters for the promotion of new brands, it is not clear why it is more protable
to create and promote its own brand, rather than promoting an independent brand under a
long term agreement. This remark is reinforced by the fact that the bargaining position of
the producer of the new brand would be small since the distributor needs not rely on main
incumbents for production.
In this paper we wish to stress an aspect which is complementary and provides some
light on the economics of distributor brands, namely the interaction between product design
and brand ownership under incomplete contracting. In an incomplete contract setting, brand
ownership allocates various decision rights to the owner, and in particular the right to decide
on the design of product characteristics (Grossman and Hart, 1986). By owning the brand,
a distributor can e¤ectively control the evolution of the products under a particular brand.
1Contributions along this line include Comanor and Rey (2000), Chintagunta et al. (2002), Kadiyali et
al. (2000), Gabrielsen and Sorgard (2007), Meza and Sudhir (2010).
2See also Bontemps, Orozco and Réquillart (2008) for a similar conclusion using the price level of national
brands.
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In this context, answering the question of whether the distributor would more protably
distribute its own brand rather than promote a brand owned at the upstream levels amounts
to identifying the potential ine¢ ciencies and conicts that may arise in the product design
process.
We then develop on the fact that, in an optimal relationship, the agent with the most
relevant information should be allocated the right to decide on the evolution of the products
characteristics.3 Notice that the development of computerized technologies has changed the
balance on this respect in a dramatic way, as distributors have now access to fast, reliable
and essential information through sales records, as well as the ability to treat this huge
data. The idea demonstrated below is that the better informed party should be the one who
chooses the characteristics of the product, a decision that belongs to the owner of the brand.
Thus a shift in the information structure can justify a shift in the ownership of brands (with
an idea similar to Schmalensee, 1982, that the informational advantage is used in the design
of products).
Another aspect that one should bear in mind is that there may be a conict of interest
between large producers and distributors that can hardly be resolved at the development
stage. Producers and distributors do not face the same objective for two reasons. First,
distributors may be more concerned about the potential cannibalization of competing brands
by one brand, as they distribute several brands. Second the markets are not the same, as
large producers serve several markets through several distributors. While contracts help
to resolve these issues concerning prices and marketing, this is more problematic at the
development stage. In this context, a distributor may prefer to develop its own brand if it
appears that the choices of large producers in terms of product design are too far from their
needs.
In the article we present a model of vertical structure with bilateral asymmetric informa-
tion (section 2). We analyze successively the case where the distributor owns the brand and
3The view that an organization may "delegate" decisions to informed party is developed by Dessein
(2002), among others.
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designs the product (section 3) and the case where the producer owns the brand (section
4). In section 5, we compare the aggregate prot of the vertical structure under the two
ownership structures. Section 6 discusses a variant in which the bargaining power and the
ownership do not coincide. The last section concludes.
2 A base model
We consider a distributor and a producer of some product, who have di¤erent information
about the cost and the demand for such a product. This di¤erence in information may lead to
di¤erent choices in terms of product design. The distributor is the sole distributor in the area
and the producer the sole producer. They produce/distribute a branded product, where the
brand may belong to the distributor or the producer. Expected demand is D(p x) where
x 2 R is the product characteristic referred to as quality and  is a demand shifter. The
distributor gross prot is pD(p   x), where the price is normalized for distribution cost.
The inverse of D is denoted P so that the retail price is p = P (Q) + x:
A quantity Q of quality x  0 can be produced by the producer at a production cost
C(Q; x; ) = cQ+(; x). Hence, the unit variable cost is independent of quality, while there
is a xed cost that varies with the product characteristics (as Mills, 1995, does for national
brands versus private labels4) and depends on the producers type .5 Thus we assume that
the main cost for the producers is caused by the need to reshape the production line so as
to adjust to the new product design. Once this is done the unit cost is basically the same
for all levels of quality.6
The informational asymmetry comes from the fact that the distributor privately knows
4Contrary to Mills (1995) who justies that the production of national brands involves a higher xed cost
due to advertising, here we do not impose the ad hoc assumption that private labels would not incur a xed
cost but assume that the xed cost is related to quality (x) which implies the same correlation between xed
cost national brand versus private label as for Mills (1995) given that he considers that national brands are
of better quality than private labels.
5In what follows, some results depend on the fact that the marginal cost is known. It could depend on x
also with no changes in the main conclusions.
6An alternative interpretation is that the xed cost is an opportunity cost supported by the producer,
due the e¤ect of the quality distributed on his prots on other markets.
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the demand shifter , while the producer privately knows the cost parameter : For con-
ciseness, we assume that the demand shifter  can take only two values, 1 or 2, where
1 < 2, and the cost parameter  can take only two values, 1 or 2, where 1 < 2. We
denote by f (i) the probability that  = i and by g (i) the probability that  = i.The
vector of information (; ) can thus take four values fi; jg, i = 1; 2, j = 1; 2. Information
is soft and therefore cannot be transmitted. Demand and cost functions are supposed to be
twice di¤erentiable and to verify:
i) QP (Q) is concave and P (0) is large.
ii) (; x) is increasing and convex in x, (; 0) = @
@x
(; 0) = 0 and limx!+1  (; x) = +1.
iii) (x)  (2; x)  (1; x) is positive and increasing for x > 0.
The rst condition ensures that the optimal quantity is unique and positive. The second
condition ensures that it is optimal to choose a positive quality. The last one expresses that
the technology parameter  shifts the marginal cost of raising quality. We also assume that
 is convex enough so that an interior solution always exists for the product design stage
(prots are strictly quasi-concave in x). These assumptions simply mean that the parameter
 is an index of e¢ ciency of the rm in the xed cost of production (the higher the lower
the xed cost) and that the inverse demand function is not too convex.
If the information (; ) were veriable and the parties were able to sign a complete con-
tract on the product characteristic, the quantity and the wholesale price, then the industry
prot maximizing production and design would be implementable. Similarly an integrated
monopoly could take advantage of all information. Denote Qm(; x) the (full information)
integrated monopoly quantity for given quality x, it maximizes the (variable) integrated
monopoly prot:
m(; x)  max
Q
(P (Q) + x  c)Q:
The monopoly quantity is increasing in  and x, and characterized by the well known
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condition
P (Qm(; x)) + x  c
P (Qm(; x)))
=
1
"(Qm(; x))
where "(Q) =   P (Q)
QP 0(Q) .
The integrated monopoly total prot is then
V M (; )  max
x
fm(; x)  (; x)g ,
which is obtained for a quality level xM(; ) solution of the rst-order condition
Qm(; xM(; )) =
@
@x
(; xM(; )).
and thus gives a quantity solution QM(; )  Qm(; xM(; )). Notice that under our
assumptions, the prot maximizing quality xM(; ) is strictly positive for all (; ).
We wish to contrast the situation where ownership belongs to the upstream producer to
the situation where it belongs to the distributor. The owner of the brand is assigned the right
to decide on all variables that are related to the product: the parameter x, and whether the
good is distributed or not. In the context of a brand, we assume that the ownership provides
also bargaining power.7 Typically, we see the situation as follows. The distributor has no
brand, while the producer is a large well known brand producer. Then the producer has
a large bargaining power as it bargains on the distribution of his product and there are
no existing alternatives. Only the distributor can provide an alternative by creating its
own brand. This is a long-run decision. Then the distributor stops the distribution of the
national brand and introduces his brand. He then turns to the producer to produce the
brand. Here the negotiation is only on the production of the product, where the producer
has less bargaining power. To complete the analysis, we shall also examine the case where
ownership only a¤ects the right to design the product, and the bargaining power remains to
the distributor in any case.
We consider the following timing for the game between the producer and the distributor.
7As we will see, this assumption facilitates the analysis, although ultimately we may wish to separate the
right to decide on the products characteristics and the bargaining power.
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1. The distributor learns , the producer learns .
2. The owner chooses x, which is publicly observed.
3. The owner proposes a contract (Q; T ) where Q is production and T a transfer from
the distributor to the producer.
4. Production takes place and prots are realized.
The respective prots are D = Q (P (Q) + x)   T for the distributor, and P =
T   cQ   (; x) for the producer. Notice that the quality decision takes place before the
contracting stage, reecting the fact that product design decisions are revised less frequently
than prices and quantities.
3 The distributor owns the brand
Consider the case where the distributor is the owner of a brand. The distributor chooses
x and proposes a cost reimbursement contract to the producer. Given that the variable
production cost is known, we can see the contract as follows. First, the distributor sets a
wholesale price w = c, then he proposes a xed payment F in exchange of production of
positive quality x. Thus T = F + cQ. Faced to such a contract, the producer accepts to
produce if the xed payment F covers his xed costs (; x). Clearly, with only two levels
of xed cost, it is optimal to set a xed payment either at F = (2; x) or at F = (1; x).
In the latter case, the producer of type 2 turns down the o¤er and the product is not
produced.8 The distributor then obtains
(P (Q) + x  c)Q  (2; x) if F = (2; x);
g (1) f(P (Q) + x  c)Q  (1; x)g if F = (1; x):
Denote by D () 2 f1; 2g the critical level such that (D; x) = F . Then, it is opti-
mal for the distributor to choose the quality and the quantity that maximizes the prot
8An alternative would be that generic quality x = 0 is produced with a zero prot for the producer. This
would yield similar conclusions.
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(P (Q) + x  c)Q  (D; x): This is because as the xed cost is only paid if the producer
accepts to produce, the distributor captures the total prot generated by the "marginal"
producer  = D (). Given our assumption that 
m(; x)   (; x) is quasi-concave in x,
the choice of characteristic is uniquely dened by
xD () = x
M (; D ())
and the quantity is then QD ()  QM(; D()). When production occurs, the allocation
is thus the same as with an integrated monopoly having a cost (D(); x) and the prot
is V M (; D ()). The choice of the xed payment F (and thus of D) then results from a
choice between paying a high price and obtaining the good for sure and paying a low price
at the risk of not obtaining the good. The distributor chooses the rst option, D () = 2,
whenever
V M(; 2)  g (1)V M(; 1)
which is the case if the likelihood of the e¢ cient technology is not too large, more precisely
if:
g1 () =
V M(; 2)
V M(; 1)
 g (1) (1)
A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that for all x on the relevant range
(m(; x)  (2; x))
1  g(1)
g(1)
> (x): (2)
where we recall that (x)  (2; x)  (1; x). We conclude that
Proposition 1 When the distributor owns the brand and the producer accepts the o¤er, the
allocation is the same as if there were an integrated monopoly with the technology of the least
e¢ cient producer accepting the o¤er.
The distributor chooses to pay the high xed cost if the cost di¤erential  (x) is small or
if the likelihood g (1) of a small xed cost is small.
One immediate consequence of the fact that the cost of quality perceived by the distrib-
utor is larger than the true one is thus that either there is under-production or the quality
is distorted downward:
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Corollary 1 A distributor owning the brand provides lower quality than an integrated monopoly
or no good at all.
Proof. If the producer accepts for all , then xD() = xM(; 2) < xM(; 1): Otherwise
quality is xD () = xM (; 1) when  = 1 but it is not sold when  = 2:
Thus the main cost of having distributors ownership is that the quality choices will
be distorted downward (case F = (2; x)) or the good may not be produced (case F =
(1; x)).
4 The producer owns the brand
We consider now the case where the producer has the control rights on the product. Suppose
the producer has chosen quality x. Given that information about the demand is known only
by the distributor, the producer will o¤er a non-linear contract to the distributor. We assume
that the producer cannot monitor the retail price so that the contract is a wholesale non-linear
tari¤. From the revelation principle, for a given x, we can represent the contract at stage 3
as a menu (Q(); T ()) designed so that the distributor chooses the option (Q(); T ())
when the demand shifter parameter is . The distributor obtains
D() = (P (Q()) + x)Q()  T (): (3)
where the truth-telling constraints write as
D(1)  (P (Q(2)) + 1x)Q(2)  T (2)
D(2)  (P (Q(1)) + 2x)Q(1)  T (1):
The prot of the producer (net of the xed cost (; x)) is then
T ()  cQ () = (P (Q()) + x  c)Q()  D():
As the prot function Q (P (Q) + x) is increasing in , the distributors prot D () is
increasing in . Moreover the marginal benet of increasing quality x is increasing in :
@Q (P (Q) + 2x)
@Q
= 2x >
@Q (P (Q) + 1x)
@Q
= 1x;
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which is the standard sorting condition for the Principal-Agent problem where the pro-
ducer acts as Principal and the distributor as Agent. Following standard methods from
contract theory (see Salanié, 1997, or La¤ont and Martimort, 2002), the optimal contract
(Q(); T ()) proposed by the producer will satisfy incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints if the following conditions hold:
IC : D(2) = xQ(1)(2   1);
M : Q(2)  Q(1);
P : D(1) = 0:
The rst constraint binds the incentive constraint of the high type distributor ( = 2)
while the second states that the quantity increases with the type. The last constraint ensures
participation of both types. We thus solve the maximization program (using (3)):
max
(Q();D())
X
i=1;2
f(P (Q(i)) + ix  c)Q(i)  D(i)g f(i)
s.t. IC,M , P .
Replacing D(1) and D(2) by their values and ignoring the monotonicity constraint M ,
we obtain the reduced program:
max
Q(1);Q(2)
( n
P (Q(1)) + 1x  c  f(2)f(1)(2   1)x

Q(1)
o
f(1)
+ f(P (Q(2)) + 2x  c)Q(2)g f(2)
)
Let use dene the new parameters
^1 = 1   f(2)
f(1)
(2   1) and ^2 = 2.
This parameter measures the informational rent that has to be given (per unit of quality)
to raise the production by one unit. With this notation, the optimal quantity for type 
maximizes (P (Q) + ^x  c)Q; which solves the monopoly Lerner condition:
P (Q(i)) + ^ix  c
P (Q())
=
1
"(Q(i))
() Q (i) = Qm (^i; x) :
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The quantity Qm (^i; x) is the monopoly quantity for virtual demand shifter ^ instead
of . The production is distorted downward compared to the case where  is known. The
solution is monotonic in  so that the condition M is satised.
Given the quantities Q () and the distributors prot D(2) = xQ(1)(2   1) and
D(1) = 0; the producers total prot isX
i=1;2
f(P (Q(i)) + ix  c)Q(i)  D (i)g f(i)  (; x)
which can be written from above as
max
Q(1);Q(2)
X
i=1;2
f(P (Q(i)) + ^ix  c)Q(i)g f(i)  (; x)
=
X
i=1;2
m (^i; x) f(i)  (; x):
Using the envelop theorem, we obtain the equilibrium quality as the solution of the rst-order
condition:
X
i=1;2
^iQP (i; )f(i) =
@
@x
(; xP ());
QP (i; ) = Q
m(^i; xP ()):
We thus conclude that
Proposition 2 When the producer owns the brand, the allocation is the same as if there
were an integrated monopoly facing a demand with (virtual) demand shifter ^, choosing the
characteristic x knowing  but not , then producing under full information .
For xed quality levels, producer ownership introduces an agency problem leading to
higher prices and lower quantities.
Regarding the level of quality, the comparison with full information is ambiguous. If the
information on  were made public after the producer has designed the product, we would
have ^1 = 1 and xM(1; ) < xP () < xM(2; ). This reects the fact that the producer
designs the product before knowing the demand characteristic. To this we must add two
e¤ects. But the producers incentives to invest are hindered by the necessity to leave an
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informational rent to the distributor which leads to a reduction of the quality level for all
values of .
The comparison between the quality choice of a producer-owner and a distributor-owner
is also ambiguous. The producer perceives the true cost of quality so that investment may be
higher than with distributors ownership when  = 1, but the distributor is more e¢ cient
when deciding production which raises the marginal benets of raising quality.
5 Brand ownership and distributors information
We now address the issue of brand ownership. To discuss whether the brand should be owned
by the distributor of by the producer, we compare total prot in the two previous cases. The
interpretation is the following. There is some ex-ante stage at which the parties can agree
on whether the retailer will distribute its own brand or the brand of the producer. At this
stage, contracts are incomplete so that only brand ownership can be decided upon. But the
two parties can still agree on some ex-ante transfer as a compensation for not owning the
brand distributed. In this context they will choose the ownership structure that maximizes
total prot accounting for the fact that the owner will gain decision rights.
Our objective is to determine how the quality of the distributors information a¤ects the
optimal allocation of ownership. In order to better assess the impact of information on brand
ownership, we model more explicitly how this information is determined by considering the
following model.
Suppose that the true demand shifter can take two values, that we normalize to be   1
2
or  + 1
2
, with equal probabilities, where   3=2. It is never observed but the distributor
observes a signal s that can take the same two values: the signal takes the same value as
the true demand shifter with probability 1=2 +  > 1=2; where  2 [0; 1=2] while it takes the
other value with probability 1=2   (irrespective of the true value). Let 1 be the expected
value of the demand shifter given the signal s =   1
2
and 2 be the expected value of the
demand shifter given the signal s = + 1
2
. Given linearity in  of the inverse demand curve,
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we have an expected price P (Q) + ix: Thus, this induces expected demand shifter in our
model:
1 =   ; 2 = + ; with f(1) = f (2) = 1
2
:
As  increases , the distributors information varies from no information to perfect knowledge
of the true demand shifter.
We denote by VP the total industry prot when the producer owns the brand and the
precision of the distributors information is . It is given by (using the fact that 2 1 = 2):
VP =
X
j=1;2
(
1
2
X
i=1;2
m
 
^i; xP (j)
  (j; xP (j)) + xP (j)Qm(^1; xP (j))
)
g(j);
where ^1 =   3 and ^2 = + 
The producer obtains the monopoly prot for the virtual demand shifter. To this we add the
informational rent of the agent.
For  = 0, the distributor has no information and we nd that VP is equal to the aggregate
monopoly prot. Moreover VD is smaller than the monopoly prot because the distributor
doesnt design the product optimally. Thus VD < VP when  = 0. In other words, if the
distributor has no information, the producer should own the brand.
Lemma 1 Producer ownership generates more aggregate prots than distributor ownership
if the distributors information is imprecise enough, i.e. if  is small enough.
The question is thus whether distributor ownership may dominate if the distributor in-
formation is precise.
The total prot VD when the distributor owns the brand depends on whether the dis-
tributor chooses to pay the high xed cost or the low xed cost. For conciseness we rst
consider the case where the distributor always chooses to produce the good.
Assumption 1: For all  2 [1; 2], we have g1 ()  g (1).
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Notice that this is the case if (2) holds for any  2 [1; 2]. In this case, allocating the
ownership to the distributor never results in no production of the good but in under-provision
of quality. As a result the total prot under distributor ownership is given by
VD =
X
i=1;2
1
2

V M(i; 2) +  (xD(i)) g(1)
	
:
The interpretation is the following: the distributor acts as if the technology is ine¢ cient and
obtains M (; 2) : To this benet we add the cost saving that occurs when the technology
is e¢ cient.
Clearly, if  is known, total prot is maximal when the distributor owns the brand.9 We
now assume that g (1) > 0.
On the other extreme, with precise distributors information ( is large), the comparison
between VP and VD depends on the relative value of each agents information. We can measure
the value of the distributors information by its value for an integrated monopoly with xed
cost parameter . Formally this is dened as
 (; ) =
X
i=1;2
1
2
V M(i; ) max
x
(X
i=1;2
1
2
m (i; x)  (; x)
)
:
It corresponds to the value for the integrated industry of learning the information about
demand before choosing the design that maximizes total prot. It is thus an upper bound
on the value of information under symmetric information. The value  is increasing with .
On the other hand, the value of the information of the producer comes from the fact that
the vertical structure can adjust the investment in quality depending on the e¢ ciency of the
technology. This value increases when the cost di¤erential becomes larger.
Proposition 3 Under assumption 1, distributor ownership generates more aggregate prots
than producer ownership if
 (2; ) >

(xM(+
1
2
; 1)) (xM( 
1
2
; 2))

g(1):
9In this case, we have g (1) = 0 for assumption 1 to hold.
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Proof. see appendix
Thus if the asymmetry of information on costs is not too large, distributor ownership will
generate more prot in aggregate than producer ownership. The reason is that distributor
ownership better exploits the distributors information by avoiding the quantity distortion
when demand is high. Thus if the asymmetry of information on the product cost is not too
large, it will be more protable to accept a suboptimal design under distributor ownership
than a suboptimal supply under producer ownership.
Notice that the asymmetry of information on costs can be small either because  is
small, in which case the information is not important, or because g (1) is small, so that
information not too imprecise.
Consider now the case where the distributor would always propose to pay only the small
xed cost. This occurs when
Assumption 2: For all  2 [1; 2]; we have g1 () < g (1) :
Then distributor ownership results in under-production and
VD =

1
2
V M(  ; 1) +
1
2
V M(+ ; 1)

g(1) :
Here the distributor obtains the full integrated prot but only when the technology is
e¢ cient.
Again if  is known, total prot is maximal when the distributor owns the brand.10 We
assume that g (1) < 1. For  = 0, recall that VP is larger than VD as above although now
it is because distributor ownership induces under-production rather than under-investment.
The analysis then leads to a similar conclusion:
Proposition 4 Under assumption 2, distributor ownership generates more aggregate prots
than producer ownership if
 (1; ) > V
M

+
1
2
; 2

1  g (1)
g(1)
:
10In this case, we have g (1) = 1 for assumption 2 to hold.
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Proof. see appendix
We see again that when the value of the distributors information is large, it is optimal
to give ownership to the distributor whenever he has precise information.
From the two cases we conclude that it is optimal to give ownership to the distributor
when the value of his information is large enough or when there is little uncertainty on the
xed cost.
5.1 The linear-quadratic model
To gain more insight, we now discuss the e¤ect of the precision of the distributors information
on prot in a more parametric model. To this purpose, let us consider the case where demand
is linear and the cost is quadratic. To x ideas and focus on the e¤ect of the information we
x all parameters and vary  and 2. We thus have:
P (Q) = 1 Q;  (; x) = x
2
2
; c = 0;
1
2

+
1
2
2
< 1 < 2; ; g (i) =
1
2
Moreover for what follows, we will assume
 = 1:5; 1 = 3
and let vary 2 between 3 and 6. For the linear-quadratic model we nd
m (; x) =

1 + x
2
2
and Qm(; x) =
1 + x
2
;
which yields the integrated monopoly prot and allocation:
V M (; ) =
1
2

2   2 ; Q
M(; ) =

2   2 and x
M(; ) =

2   2 :
When the producer owns the brand, the above analysis implies that we have
xP () =
1
2
P
i=1;2 ^i
2   1
2
P
i=1;2 ^
2
i
=
  
2   2 + 2   102 :
One can verify that
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Lemma 2 For  2 (3; 41
8
); xP () decreases then increases when the distributors informa-
tion becomes more precise. For larger , it is decreasing.
Proof. The slope of xP is   102 20+2+2( 102+2 2+2)2 : Then 102  20+ 2 + 2 decreases with
 from (1:5)2 +2 > 0 to 5
2
 10+2 +2: Finally 5
2
 10+2 +2 =  41
4
+2 is negative
for  > 5:125:
Thus better retailer information reduces the quality investment at least when the cost is
large. The total industry prot is then
VP =
X
j=1;2
1
4
(
1
2
+
1
2
(+ ) (  )
2j   2 + 2   102
+
 (  3) (  )2 
2j   2 + 2   102
2
)
which may not be monotonic in : The sign of the derivative of VP is ambiguous as it captures
two e¤ects. On the one hand the information of the distributor is valuable as it allows to
better match supply with demand. On the other hand, asymmetric information implies
distortions in the product design and supply that are costly.
Consider now the case where the distributor owns the brand. Then g1 () =
2
1
21 2
22 2 is
decreasing in . Thus production always occurs when g1
 
+ 1
2
  1
2
(the distributor pays
the high xed cost for any information). We focus the comparison on this range. Then the
industry value is
VD =
X
i=1;2
1
4
 
2
22   2i
+
2   1
2

i
22   2i
2!
where 1 =    and 2 = + :
The value VD is increasing in  by convexity of the prot in .11
Consider parameters  = 3
2
and 1 = 3. When 2 varies from 3 to 6, we can verify
that g1 (2) > 12 . We plot below the value functions under producer ownership and under
11Similarly when g1
 
  12

< g (1) we have VD =
1
4
1=2
21 ( )2 +
1
4
1=2
21 (+)2 :
When g1
 
+ 12

< g (1)  g1
 
  12

and  is large, we have VD =
1
4

2
22 ( )2 +
2 1
2

 
22 ( )2
2
+ 14
1=2
21 (+)2 :
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distributor ownership (dotted lines) for di¤erent values of 2. The plots of the value functions
then show that the two curves cross only once and that distributors ownership generates
more aggregate prot for  above a threshold when 2 < 5.
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6 When ownership does not give bargaining power
We have assumed so far that due to the nature of branded products (their necessity) in the
large distribution, the owner of the brand had a large bargaining. We discuss briey the
case where the owner of the brand has the right to design the product but has no bargaining
power.
Consider the case where the producer owns the brand, but once x is chosen the distributor
o¤ers a contract on a take-it or leave it basis. The game has to be analyzed as a signalling
game, where the choice of product characteristic signals the type of the producer. It is
then immediate to see that given that revealing himself as having a low costs would result
in no rent in the contracting stage, the only equilibria of this signalling games are pooling
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equilibria. The choice of characteristic x is the same for both values of : Then there is a
continuum of equilibria. Given x, the distributor then chooses the monopoly quantity and
would cover the xed cost (2; x).
A similar argument would show that if the distributor were to choose x, while the pro-
ducer chooses the contract, then the choice of x would be the same for 1 and 2. The
contract would then be designed as in the case above of production ownership.
Thus when decision rights on product characteristics do not convey some bargaining
power, the result is that the decision becomes non-reactive to any information. From the
vertical structure perspective, this is suboptimal, as no information is used to optimize the
product design stage.
7 Conclusion
Our paper shows that the most protable ownership structure for brands depends on the in-
formation structure. Whenever distributors have access to a superior information for brand-
ing strategies, it may be more protable to have these choices delegated to the distributors.
We have assumed that negotiations on ownership were done with no distortions, but the
incentives of the distributor to introduce its own brand should be higher under imperfect
bargaining over ownership. This is because, the distributor would have to care about the
bargaining power that ownership would give to the producer.
The paper thus illustrates the fact that one element that may explain the recent trend
towards the introduction by distributors of their own label, is the development of information
technologies that has dramatically raised the amount of information that large distribution
chains can collect and treat. As information improves in the downstream part of the market,
then it becomes more protable for the distributor to introduce its private label, rather than
to continue to distribute producerslabels. This argument requires however to admit that
the distributor is in a good position to impose its new label and thus can leverage reputation
e¤ects. Thus the argument is just one part of the story and is complementary to others
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arguments that can be advanced (as reputation e¤ects, lower costs for in store promotion
campaign..).
In terms of welfare, the e¤ect of introducing the distributor private label is ambiguous.
Distributors typically under-invest in quality in our model. With producers brand ownership,
there may be less or more under-investment, while there is a double marginalization problem
due to the necessity to leave an informational rent to the distributor. Thus one cannot assess
a priori whether the introduction of distributor labels reduces or raises consumerswelfare.
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A Appendix
Proof of proposition 3. Notice that the expected variable prot of the producer is
1
2
m (  3; x) + 1
2
m (+ ; x) = m (  ; x)
Thus
VP =

max
x

1
2
m (  3; x) + 1
2
m (+ ; x)  (2; x)

+
1
2
xP ()Q
m(  3; xP (2))

g(2)
+

max
x

m (  3; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (1; x)

+
1
2
xP ()Q
m(  3; xP (1))

g(1)
But
max
x

1
2
m (  3; x) + 1
2
m (+ ; x)  (; x)

+
1
2
xP ()Q
m(  3; xP ())
< max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (; x)

Therefore
VP < g(2) max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (2; x)

+g(1) max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (2; x) + (x)

Using the fact that x is smaller than xM(+ 1
2
; 1) in all cases, we have
VP < max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (2; x)

+ (xM(+
1
2
; 1))g(1):
Moreover
VD =
1
2

V M (  ; 2) +  (xD(  )) g(1)
	
+
1
2

V M (+ ; 2) +  (xD(+ )) g(1)
	
:
Using the fact that x is larger than xM
 
  1
2
; 2

VD >
1
2
V M (  ; 2) +
1
2
V M (+ ; 2) + (x
M(  1
2
; 2))g (1) :
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Then we nd
VD   VP >  (2; ) 

(xM(+
1
2
; 1)) (xM( 
1
2
; 2))

g(1):
Thus VP < VD for  (2; ) >
 
(xM(+ 1
2
; 1)) (xM(  12 ; 2))

g(1).
Proof of proposition 4. We have
VP <
X
2f1;2g
max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (; x)

g()
and
VD =

1
2
V M (  ; 1) +
1
2
V M (+ ; 1)

g(1)
= max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (1; x)

g (1) +  (1) g(1):
This implies that
VP   VD < max
x

m (  ; x)
2
+
m (+ ; x)
2
  (2; x)

g(2)g (2)   (1) g(1)
< V M

+
1
2
; 2

g (2)   (1; ) g(1):
Therefore when V M
 
+ 1
2
; 2

g (2)   (1; ) g(1); it must be the case that VP < VD:
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